Financial product avoidance: group mismatches
The measure
A discussion document has been released proposing a new 'principles-based' anti-avoidance approach to transactions that involve loan relationships and derivatives that give rise to 'group mismatches' - ie where a transaction gives rise to an asymmetry (tax deductible losses versus non-taxable profits) between companies in the same group.
This is a response to the number of schemes notified to HMRC under the tax disclosure rules in respect of loan relationships and derivatives which involve a mismatch between the taxation of two group companies. This tax asymmetry potentially gives rise to a tax advantage for the group where there is no overall corresponding economic loss.
To date HMRC's approach has been to introduce a series of complex legislative changes to counteract these schemes one by one. Today's proposal is to introduce principled-based legislation mirroring the approach of the disguised interest and transfer of income stream rules which are perceived to have been an effective way of tackling anti-avoidance.
In the discussion document, HMRC have outlined how a generic approach to counteracting asymmetric avoidance could operate. In particular, the rules could apply where:
- there is a 'tax mismatch arrangement' between connected companies;
- it would be reasonable to assume that the arrangement was designed to
secure, either:
- a reduction in the group's tax rate as a result of asymmetric treatment of a loan or derivative; or
- a possible reduction in the group's effective tax rate as a result of a contingency (e.g. currency movements or another index), unless that contingency gives rise to an equivalent likelihood of an increase in the group's tax rate.
HMRC identifies that there are a number of solutions that could address such
asymmetry (eg the exclusion of debits and credits, imposition of further debits
and credits, or otherwise cancelling the UK tax advantage). This detail is
expected to be worked through as part of the consultation process.
A key question to be considered as part of the consultation is whether this
legislation should impact only UK-UK transactions or be extended to cover cross
border arrangements. It will also be
expected to cover the possibility of repealing various targeted anti-avoidance
rules including, potentially, the arbitrage rules (or part thereof). HMRC also
welcome input into whether this principle based approach would be effective, the
scope of any such rule (eg whether it should be wider than UK-UK transactions,
and if so, how), and whether it is appropriate to include a purpose test, or
express exclusions.
Who will be affected?
Potentially all UK corporation tax payers.
When?
Comments on the discussion document are requested by 31 May 2010. A workshop is proposed to follow in June or July 2010 and draft legislation will be released as part of the 2010 Pre-Budget Report for introduction as part of the Finance Bill 2011.
We agree with the approach to simplify what is an increasingly complex area with
a growing body of targeted anti-avoidance legislation. However, the devil will
be in the detail. The comprehensive consultation process which accompanied the
recent disguised interest and transfer of income streams rules resulted in
extensive changes to the initial proposals and it will be essential to consult
widely to ensure that commercial transactions are not affected and that it is
possible for taxpayers to obtain certainty.
One of the effects of the new debt cap regime (another complex set of rules) is
to severely limit the types of group mismatch opportunities generally, so we
would also question whether another reform process is actually needed.
Although HMRC are clear that they wish to establish symmetry within groups, it
is disappointing that they do not appear to have defined, or limited this
beyond, a principle of symmetry. The difficult questions and issues will be both
those that they have identified for further discussion and those which cannot be
identified until a clearer definition and scope has been identified. To ensure
that these proposed rules do not act as another deterrent to international
business being conducted with the UK, HMRC should ensure that it sets out a
framework and clear scope early in the process.
The discussion document sets out that its aim is to ensure that it is only UK
tax advantaged schemes that should be caught, and that a purpose test or
specific exclusions might be appropriate. We agree that there need to be
exclusions for commercial transactions. However, the initial suggestion of a
test that is based on whether it would be reasonable to assume the arrangement
is designed to reduce the group's tax rate is concerning.
Firstly, the inclusion of an 'objective purpose test' should be resisted unless
there is a comprehensive clearance process (which the arbitrage rules currently
provide). Secondly, this introduces a new legislative measure of how you measure
a group's tax rate. In addition it appears that the question of whether there is
an increase in the rate of tax requires a 'counterfactual' assumption. This
inevitably is a subjective matter and is likely to give rise to disagreement
between taxpayers and HMRC. Hopefully, in the pursuit of simplification, this
new measure will not increase uncertainty and add to the compliance complexities
for the taxpayer.






